

22 September 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NIPE

SUBJECT: Implementation of Middle East Task Force  
Recommendations

1. This report of and by itself does not provide a solid base from which to develop specific recommendations for the USIB; it was to be only the first of several "clinical studies" and had, as a major purpose, the identification of problems inherent in any attempt to determine the totality of intelligence activity on any given area of subject. The report itself notes that its observations and recommendations require further consideration in light of other area or functional studies and Ambassador Nolting at the USIB stated that "firm overall recommendations should await the completion of similar studies on other areas".

2. In essence all of the Report's recommendations are in the nature of questions or suggestions for further study:

a. Are there enough "producers" to ensure that all information collected receives optimum exploitation?

b. Does the present emphasis on current intelligence leave insufficient time and talent to analyze raw information on a continuing basis to check trends and make quantitative estimates and comparisons?

c. Should there be a system for the review of events after the fact to correct or substantiate previous conclusions?


d. Is the Community's production manpower unduly concentrated on the "hot spots"?

e. Consideration should be given to:

(1) The development of a program to provide the analysts/producers more opportunity to acquire firsthand knowledge of the country or area with which they are concerned.

(2) The development of "country specialists" with a view to centralizing production experience, expertise, background-in-depth, and responsibility on a country by country basis.

f. Systematic coordination of requirements is needed to reduce to the absolute minimum the dispatch to the field of similar or identical requirements.



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i. The policy makers should devote more time and attention to the available intelligence information.

3. You will note that most of the recommendations deal with the production area of the Community's activities, furthermore, the task

force raised these questions with respect to all areas, not just the Middle East, on the basis that conditions there would be representative of most other areas. In addition, the report tried to stress the point that the evidence developed was circumstantial at best and not conclusive.

4. Ray Cline seems to go along with our indications of a "possible" imbalance between collection and production and on the hot spot concentration. I agree with him that there is no ideal balance between the numbers of collectors and producers that could be applied to all areas, however, if we can determine, for each country, just what the collector/producer balance is at any given point time, any significant imbalances will be readily apparent on just a plain common sense basis. I liked Ray's reference to "research capital" and we had better make sure that the Agency and the Community as a whole are not neglecting this item.

5. Gen. Blake's comments indicate that he has missed the point that the Report gives indications only, not conclusions. Furthermore, as most of the recommendations deal with the production area they would not be proper subjects for the CCPC. With respect to his specific points, I have the following comments:

a. There is no data currently available that could be used to make any relative comparisons between sources on the basis of cost versus value of the "take", and even if you could develop such data, it would be valid only for one specific point in time. The basic question is the importance of any particular country or subject in terms of U.S. interests and what specific subjects need coverage. You then try to develop the type of intelligence system that will provide such coverage as economically and effectively as possible - the mix in any given case will depend on many factors, some subject to U.S. control and some not. Finally, if you are going to attack this problem at all it should be done by the producers and end-users, not by the collectors on the CCPC.

b. The problem of defining "collectors" or "producers" is a hard nut to crack and however it is done, there will always be some people who think they are being down-graded if excluded from one or the other category. In football, everyone can't be a ball carrier, someone has to carry the water bucket. Any sensible system of categorization will do, the essential thing is that the system be standardized.

c. I don't know what Gen. Blake means by "term in depth reporting."

d. The subject of indicators and indicator value is again, I think one that should be handled by the producers and end-users, not the collectors.

6. I do not believe that there is much profit to be made from more piece-meal studies by area or function until we have developed our basic "census" of Community intelligence personnel and thereby have a solid base from which to develop whatever special studies may be required, including further action on the various recommendations contained in the Middle East report.

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